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Abstract
When information flow fails, when Democrats and Republi-
cans do not talk to each other, when Israelis and Palestinians
do not talk to each other, and when North Koreans and South
Koreans do not talk to each other, mis-perceptions, biases and
fake news arise. In this paper we present an in-depth study of
political polarization and social division using Twitter data
and Monte Carlo simulations. First, we study at the aggregate
level people’s inclination to retweet within their own ideolog-
ical circle. Introducing the concept of cocoon ratio, we show
that Donald Trump’s followers are 2.56 more likely to retweet
a fellow Trump follower than to retweet a Hillary Clinton fol-
lower. Second, going down to the individual level, we show
that the tendency of retweeting exclusively within one’s ide-
ological circle is stronger for women than for men and that
such tendency weakens as one’s social capital grows. Third,
we use a one-dimensional Ising model to simulate how a so-
ciety with high cocoon ratios could end up becoming com-
pletely divided. We conclude with a discussion of our find-
ings with respect to fake news.
Introduction
“One of the dangers of the Internet is that people can have
entirely different realities, they can be just cocooned in in-
formation that reinforces their current biases.”
– former President Barack Obama
We live in the age of social media where Facebook, Twit-
ter and Snapchat, to name just a few, constitute an integral
part of our life. One of the distinctive features of social me-
dia is that we can easily find and befriend people with no
more than a few clicks (Wang, Zhang, and Luo 2017). As
a result, we can easily connect with hundreds if not thou-
sands of people (Kwak et al. 2010) with little geographical
restriction (Tranos and Nijkamp 2013).
The easiness of finding friends, in turn, is giving us the
luxury of clustering only with like-minded people (McPher-
son, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001; Barbera´ 2015). It is part
of our human nature to connect with people similar to us
and avoid individuals who are very different, because dis-
tance is costly (Katelyn Y. A. McKenna 2000). Such dis-
tance can be, for example, geography (Kwak et al. 2010),
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interests (Bisgin, Agarwal, and Xu 2010) or political views
(Wang, Zhang, and Luo 2017).
The easiness of connecting with people on social media
and our inclination to cluster around similar people, unfor-
tunately, combine to sow the perfect seed for social divi-
sion and polarization. People of shared opinions, such as Tea
Party1, Vote Leave2 and Hillary for Prison3, group together,
circulate, and reinforce their shared ideas via, for example,
retweets and @mentions. The result is bias, mis-perception,
and fake news. As former president Barack Obama warns,
“one of the dangers of the Internet is that people can have
entirely different realities, they can be just cocooned in in-
formation that reinforces their current biases.”
In this paper, we present an in-depth analysis of this phe-
nomenon using Twitter data and Monte Carlo simulations.
In particular, we focus on the retweeting behavior. We first
study at the aggregate level people’s inclination to retweet
within their own ideological circle. Introducing the concept
of cocoon ratio, we show, for example, that Donald Trump’s
followers are 2.56 more likely to retweet a fellow Trump fol-
lower than to retweet a Hillary Clinton follower. Second, go-
ing down to the individual level, we show that the tendency
of retweeting within one’s own ideological circle is stronger
for women than for men and that such tendency gradually
weakens as one’s social capital grows. Third, we use a one-
dimensional Ising model to simulate how a society with a
high cocoon ratio might end up being closed and isolated.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
• In a time of fake news and political polarization, we pro-
vide a thorough analysis of social cocooning on the inter-
net.
• Going down to the individual level, we analyze how social
capital and gender might play a role in the development of
social division.
• We provide Monte Carlo simulations to better understand
how our society might veer toward complete social divi-
sion.
• We make our data and code publicly available to facilitate
replication and further research.
1https://twitter.com/teapartyorg.
2https://twitter.com/vote leave.
3https://twitter.com/HRC4Prison.
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Related Literature
Our work draws inspiration from branches in political sci-
ence, sociology and social media studies. We divide the re-
lated literature into three categories: homophily in sociology
and social media studies, polarization in American politics
(and to some extent fake news), and studies of the retweeting
behavior.
Homophily, the Internet, and Social Fragmentation
Social clustering, which is the opposite side of polarization,
represents the idea that birds of the same feather flock to-
gether (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001; Barbera´
2015; Goodreau, Kitts, and Morris 2009). People tend to
cluster along lines of socio-demographic and interpersonal
characteristics such as race, marriage, friendship, gender, re-
ligion, age, class, and education (Nahon and Hemsley 2014;
Wang, Zhang, and Luo 2017).
Regarding the political effects of the internet, some schol-
ars have argued that the emergence of internet-mediated
forms of communication increases public participation and
enhance individual freedom, cultural diversity, political dis-
course, and justice (Woodly 134; Benkler 2007). Some oth-
ers, however, have warned against the possibility of peo-
ple using “the Internet to listen and speak only to the like-
minded” (Sunstein 2009).
Several earlier studies of political blogs, for example,
have found that liberals tend to link to other liberal blogs
and conservatives tend to link to other conservative blogs
(Adamic and Glance 2005; Nahon and Hemsley 2014).
Building on this line of research, our paper attempts to detect
and analyze homophily in individuals’ retweeting behavior.
Polarization in American Politics
Earlier works have studied the increasing polarization of
American politics at both the elite level (Hare and Poole
2014; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2009) and the mass
level (Campbell 2016; Doherty 2014; Fiorina and Abrams
2008; Jacobson 2016). Druckman et al., in particular, study
how elite partisan polarization affects public opinion forma-
tion and find that party polarization decreases the impact of
substantive information (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus
2013).
The phenomenon of polarization became all the more ap-
parent during the 2016 presidential election, where Trump
and Clinton depicted two radically different pictures of
America. Trump tried to paint “a picture of a bitter, bro-
ken country,” whereas Hillary Clinton would like to high-
light “the energy and optimism” in America (Clinton 2017).
From a language and visual perspective, Wang et al. (Wang
et al. 2017) studies to what extent Trump followers on Twit-
ter can be distinguished from Hillary Clinton’s followers.
Retweeting
Retweeting, most commonly represented with the form “RT
@user message,” is Twitter’s equivalent of email forward-
ing (Boyd, Golder, and Lotan 2010). It serves as a form
of information dissemination (Kwak et al. 2010), a means
of participating in diffuse conversations and a way to pub-
licly agree with someone (Boyd, Golder, and Lotan 2010).
Empirical studies have found that people are more likely
to retweet messages from friends (Boyd, Golder, and Lotan
2010) and ones that they are interested in (Luo et al. 2013;
Lee et al. 2015; Yang et al. 2010; Cha et al. 2010).
A consistent finding among these studies is that people
tend to retweet messages of interest and messages from
friends. Since Trump (Clinton) followers share the same in-
terest in Trump (Clinton) and by the principle of homophily
they are more likely to be friends in the first place, we hy-
pothesize that Trump followers are more likely to retweet
fellow Trump followers than to retweet Clinton followers
and that Clinton followers are more likely to retweet fellow
Clinton followers than to retweet Trump followers.
Data
Defining Candidate Followers
The core of our dataset is the tweets posted by Trump fol-
lowers and Hillary followers. Here, we set our target users as
the 7.497 million people who were following Donald Trump
on Twitter on April 9th, 2016 and from the 5.905 million
people who were following Hillary Clinton on April 10th,
2016. We choose these pre-election days in April so that the
action of following could serve as a stronger signal of inter-
est and support as compared to after the election in Novem-
ber 2016. Throughout we do not assume that all followers
are supporters.
Figure 1: Of the 12.48 million Trump followers and Hillary
followers, only 0.93 million people are following both of
them. In our experiments, we select data exclusively from
people who only follow Trump (pink) and who only follow
Clinton (blue). Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton are not
included in these samples.
Following (Wang et al. 2017), we remove individuals who
were following both Trump and Clinton, which amount to
930,783 people (Figure1). Then we randomly sample 1 mil-
lion users among Trump followers (purple) and 1 million
users among Clinton followers (blue). For each selected in-
dividual, we collect up to 100 tweets. Data collection was
carried out in December 2017.
100 Tweets Per Person
We set the limit of data collection to 100 tweets per per-
son rather than the 3,000 maximum allowed on Twitter so
as to alleviate the problem of unbalanced representation, as
an individual with 3,000 tweets could have a representation
equivalent to 3,000 individuals with only one tweet. We do
not follow the 1 tweet per person principle either, because
we do need substantial numbers of tweets to capture an in-
dividual’s (re)tweeting pattern. As a result, we set the limit
to 100 as a compromise.
Of the 1 million Hillary followers, we find that 130,885
(13%) accounts are either private or no longer exist, as
a result of which we do not collect postings from them.4
From the remaining 869,115 public accounts, we collected
41,174,942 tweets from Clinton followers. Of the 1 mil-
lion Trump followers, we find that 141,723 (14%) accounts
are either private or have been deleted. From the remain-
ing 858,277 Trump followers, we were able to to collect
41,779,547 tweets.
Data Attributes
For each tweet, we store the message, the creation date,
the id of the message and the user id. Besides tweet at-
tributes, for each individual we also collect their screen
name, for example @PhilippeReines, name, for example
Philippe Reines, and the number of followers. We use screen
name to uniquely identify individuals as they are used as
handlers in retweets and mentions. We infer gender from a
person’s name (Wang, Zhang, and Luo 2017). We use the
number of followers as a proxy for social capital (Wang, Li,
and Luo 2016).
Data Distribution
In Table 1, we report the percentile distribution of the num-
ber of tweets per person. It can be seen that for over 30
percent of Clinton’s followers and 20 percent of Trump fol-
lowers in our sample set, we collected 100 tweets. For the
bottom 10% of the sampled individuals, however, we only
collected 2 tweets. This holds true for both Hillary Clinton
and Donald Trump.
Table 1: Distribution of the Number of Tweets per Individual
Percentile Hillary Clinton Donald Trump
90% 100 100
80% 100 100
70% 100 99
50% 70 73
40% 70 73
30% 28 30
20% 5 5
10% 2 2
4The list of such accounts is reported in the first author’s web-
site for verification and reproduction.
In Figure 2, we report the time-series distribution of our
data. The y axis is the natural logarithm of the number of
tweets posted and the x axis is each day from 2008 to 2017.
It can be seen that the oldest tweets in our collection date
back to 2008. A straight line fits the data points reasonably
well, suggesting that the number of tweets in our collection
grew exponentially with most tweets falling into the year of
2017.
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Figure 2: The time-series distribution of tweets from Hillary
Clinton’s followers (Upper) and from Donald Trump’s fol-
lowers (Lower). For better visualization, we randomly sam-
pled 2% of the original data points.
Processing Retweets
From each tweet, we extract two main signals: retweet and
mention. The first example below is a retweet and it rep-
resents an edge between the retweeter and the originator.
The second tweet mentions @glennbeck. Twitter mentions
represent another directed edge between originator and the
person being mentioned. In our discussion, we will mostly
focus on retweets and only briefly report on the summary
statistics of the mentions.
RT @OutVeo: There’s nothing quite like having experts
build your business for you is there?
@glennbeck He does have tendency to get off subject and
ramble as if we wanted to hear that part.
Using regular expression, we extract all the Twitter users
who are being retweeted or mentioned. Regarding recursive
retweets, i.e., retweets of the form RT @A RT @B msg
(Yang et al. 2010), we treat user A as the originator of the
tweet and discard B.
Empirical Findings
In this section, we present our main findings. First, we
present aggregate analysis of the retweet patterns of Trump
followers and Clinton followers. Second, we perform econo-
metric analysis at the individual level and model an individ-
ual’s openness to opposite opinions as a function of gender,
social capital and ideology. Third, we simulate the dynamics
of social openness using an Ising model.
Information Cocoon
Our study is inspired by President Obama’s warning against
the dangers of individual citizens getting ‘cocooned’ in bias
via social media and by the prevalence of fake news stories
(Allcott and Gentzkow 2017a; Jin et al. 2017b) surround-
ing the 2016 presidential election. In this subsection, we
show that Trump (Clinton) followers are much more likely
to retweet a fellow Trump (Clinton) follower.
Table 2: Retweet Matrix
Source Clinton Trump Other Cocoon Ratio
Clinton 2,028,960 497,742 13,321,216 4.08
Trump 547,952 1,405,751 12,517,074 2.56
The Retweet Matrix In total, we found that 15,847,918
tweets out of the 41,174,942 tweets (38.5%) by Clinton
followers are retweets. Among the 15.8 million retweets,
2,028,960 originated from other Clinton followers. By con-
trast, only 497,742 retweets originated from Trump’s fol-
lowers. We found 14,470,777 tweets out of the 41,779,547
tweets by Trump followers are retweets (34.6%). Among
the 14.5 million retweets, 1,405,751 tweets originated from
other Trump followers. Only 547,952 tweets originated from
Clinton followers.
Here we introduce the idea of cocoon ratio. We define
cocoon ratio as the ratio of retweeting one’s own candidate’s
followers to retweeting the opposite candidate’s followers.
For example, cocoon ratio for Hillary Clinton’s followers is
calculated as follows:
Cocoon Ratioc =
#{retweets of Clinton followers}
#{retweets of Trump followers}
=
2, 028, 960
497, 742
= 4.08
We observe that a Clinton follower is 4.08 times more likely
to retweet a fellow Clinton follower than a Trump follower
and that a Trump follower is 2.56 times more likely retweet
a fellow Trump follower than a Clinton follower.
The Mention Matrix In a similar vein, we calculate the
cocoon ratio based on Twitter mentions (Table 3). Consis-
tent with retweets, we find that Trump (Clinton) followers
are more likely to mention other Trump (Clinton) followers
in a tweet, thus reinforcing Trump (Clinton) followers as a
group.
Table 3: Mention Matrix
Source Clinton Trump Other Cocoon Ratio
Clinton 2,137,774 712,437 18,532,273 3.00
Trump 910,439 2,216,796 19,488,038 2.43
The root cause of these high cocoon ratios, we sus-
pect, lies in the fact that a person’s friends usually fol-
low the same candidate as the person does. It is psycho-
logically and ideologically less costly to befriend people
who are similar to oneself than to befriend people who
are different (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001;
Barbera´ 2015). Political ideology, in turn, constitutes an in-
tegral component of that similarity function.
Time Series Analysis
“To all Republicans and Democrats and independents
across this nation, I say it is time for us to come together as
one united people.”
– President Donald Trump
During his victory speech on November 9th, 2016 after
winning the U.S. election, President-elect Donald Trump
called on people of all ideologies to heal the division and
unite under the flag. One important question to ask is
whether or not people have responded to the president’s call.
In this subsection we analyze how the cocoon ratio has
been evolving before and after the election on a monthly ba-
sis between 2015, in which both Hillary Clinton and Don-
ald Trump declared their presidential candidacy, and 2017,
which is one year into Trump’s presidency.
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Figure 3: Monthly cocoon ratio calculated for Hillary
Clinton’s followers (upper) and Donald Trump’s followers
(lower).
We group the retweets based on the month and year in
which the tweets were posted and calculate the cocoon ratio
for each month separately. We report our findings in Fig-
ure 3, where each data point represents a month. We find
that the cocoon ratio has been increasing for both Hillary
Clinton and Donald Trump throughout the presidential cam-
paign. The increase only accelerated in the last months of
the election and peaked in November.
We also notice that after the election the cocoon ratio
has been staying at a high level rather than return to the
pre-election levels. This suggests that union between the
Democrats, the Republicans and the Independents has not
realized, contrary to what President Trump called for in his
victory speech.
Econometric Modeling
In this section, we model the cocoon phenomenon using in-
dividual attributes: gender, social capital and ideology. First,
we only select individuals from whom we have collected 100
tweets. As reported in Table 1, this amounts to more than 0.4
million samples. For each of those selected individuals, we
code as one if they have retweeted a follower of the opposite
candidate (e.g. a Clinton follower retweeting one of Donald
Trump’s followers) and zero otherwise. Mathematically, if
the probability of a person retweeting someone who follows
the opposite candidate is p, assuming i.i.d, then the probabil-
ity of retweeting that person within 100 tweets is 1-(1-p)100.
We refer to this variable as Open, indicating “open-minded.”
Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between the probability
of retweeting the opposite candidate and the probability of
Open=1.
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Figure 4: The probability of Open=1 is larger than 95%
when the probability of retweeting followers of the opposite
candidate is greater than 3%.
We infer gender information from a person’s first name
(Wang, Zhang, and Luo 2017; Mislove et al. 2011). For
this purpose, we have compiled a list of 800 names, based
on their appearance frequencies on Twitter, that are gender-
revealing, such as Mike, David, Emily and Sarah.5. We
use the number of followers as a proxy for social capi-
tal (Wang, Li, and Luo 2016), and define social capital as
log(1+#followers). We include both its linear and quadratic
terms in the regression.
We report the summary statistics in Table 4. For 56% of
our observations, Open = 1. 45% of the observations are
women. 54% are following Hillary Clinton. The mean of
social capital is 5.33.
Table 4: Regression Summary Statistics
Variable # Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Open 379,676 0.56 0.50 0 1
Female 171,703 0.45 0.50 0 1
Hillary 379,676 0.54 0.50 0 1
Social Capital 379,676 5.33 1.52 0 17.80
Social Capital2 379,676 30.77 18.06 0 316.72
Table 5: Logistic Regression
1 2 3
Open
Social Capital 0.0429*** 0.0482*** 0.219***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hillary Clinton -0.602*** -0.572*** -0.573***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.106*** -0.106***
(0.000) (0.000)
Social Capital2 -0.0151***
(0.000)
Constant 0.324*** 0.490*** 0.0435
(0.000) (0.000) (0.286)
Observations 379459 171633 171633
Pseudo R2 0.016 0.017 0.017
p-values in parentheses
* p¡0.10, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.010
We report our results in Table 5. Consistent across all
three specifications, we find that individuals with higher so-
cial capital (i.e. more followers) are more likely to retweet
followers of the opposite candidate. This suggests that peo-
ple with large personal networks are more likely to be talk-
ing with people of different opinions than people with only
a small personal network.
We also find that followers of Hillary Clinton are less
likely to retweet Trump followers than Trump followers are
to retweet Clinton followers. Lastly, compared with men,
women are less likely to retweet across the party line, con-
sistent with previous findings (Wang, Zhang, and Luo 2017;
McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001; Wang et al.
2016a; 2016b).
5The complete list is available on the first author’s website.
Modeling Dynamics of Democratic Opinions
In this subsection, we study how the variable open for
Trump’s and Clinton’s followers evolves using a one-
dimensional Ising model (Sznajd-Weron and Sznajd 2000;
Holme and Newman 2006; Stauffer 2010). As reported
above, around 56% of our observations are marked Open,
i.e., they retweet followers of the opposite candidate. Here
we mark the remaining 44% as Closed. We want to ex-
plore the steady state of the mixture of Open individuals
and Closed individuals: is it closed or open or a mixture of
the two?
Here we consider an Ising spin chain (Si; i = 0, 1, . . . N-1).
Each spin is either Open or Closed. We denote Open with
1 and Closed with -1. The dynamic rules are as follows:
• if SiSi+1 = 1 then Si1 and Si+2 take the direction of the
pair Si, Si+1, for i = 2, 3, ... , N-1.
• if SiSi+1 = -1 then Si1 takes the direction of Si+1 and
Si+2 takes the direction of Si, for i = 2, 3, ... , N-1.
For example, if an individual (i-1)’s two neighbors
(marked as i, i+1) are both closed, then individual i will
become the same as the two neighbors. If one neighbor is
closed, and the other open, then individual i will take the
same value as individual i+2. In our experiments, i takes val-
ues between 1 and N-3, inclusive.
Following the same spirit of stochastic gradient descent,
each time we randomly choose i and update Si−1 and Si+2
according to the above dynamic rules (Krapivsky and Red-
ner 2003; Liggett 1985).
Here we set N=200, and initialize the spins with a random
number generator. Each spin will be set Open with a prob-
ability of 0.53, the same as our empirical observation. With
probability of 0.47, we set them to Closed.
There are three steady states of this model:
• Closed: all individuals become Closed, i.e., they only
retweet people following the same candidate.
• Open: all individuals becomeOpen, i.e., everyone is open
to retweeting people following the opposite candidate.
• Mixed: 50% of the individuals become Closed and
the other 50% become Open. For example, one possi-
ble permutation could be [Closed, Open, Closed, Open,
Closed, Open, Closed, Open, Closed, Open, Closed,
Open, Closed, Open, ... ]
We define the overall Climate as the mean of all individ-
uals’ orientations:
Climate =
1
N
i=N∑
i=1
Si
In Figure 5, we illustrate one realization of the dynam-
ics of Climate with 1 million iterations (Sznajd-Weron and
Sznajd 2000). For each spin, we set it to 1 (denoting Open)
with probability 0.53, as observed in our empirical data. It
can be seen that Climate is approximately 0.06 at the ini-
tialization. It increases to as high as 0.9 but keeps fluctuat-
ing. After 0.4 million iterations, the mixed steady state of
[..., Closed, Open, Closed, Open, Closed, Open, Closed,
Open...] is achieved.
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Figure 5: At initialization, Climate is around 0.06, then
it keeps fluctuating. It reaches the mixed steady state after
400,000 iterations.
Next, we vary the percentage of Closed spins to analyze
its effects on the distribution of the steady state. We summa-
rize our findings in Figure 6. As the number of Closed spins
increases, the probability of the society taking the closed
steady state [... Closed, Closed, Closed, Closed, Closed,
Closed, ...] increases. The probability of reaching the mixed
steady state first increases, reaches its peak when half of
the spins are Closed at initialization, and then decreases to-
wards zero.
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Figure 6: As the percentage of Closed increases from 0 to
1, the probability of the society ending up as Closed grows
to 1.
Discussion with Respect to Fake News
“The difficulty of unmasking and eliminating fake news
is due also to the fact that many people interact in ho-
mogeneous digital environments impervious to differing
perspectives and opinions. Disinformation thus thrives on
the absence of healthy confrontation with other sources
of information that could effectively challenge prejudices
and generate constructive dialogue; instead, it risks turning
people into unwilling accomplices in spreading biased and
baseless ideas.”
– Pope Francis
The 2016 U.S. presidential election has witnessed the rise
of fake news and social bots (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017b;
Bessi and Ferrara 2016; Qiu et al. 2017). It is reported that
the most viral fake news stories were more widely shared
on Facebook than the most popular mainstream news stories
(Silverman 2016). Some commentators even suggest that
fake news has affected the U.S. election result (Dewey 2016;
Read 2016).
Faced with the threat of fake news, researchers have ex-
perimented with various algorithms in an effort to identify
fake news, including SVM, decision trees, decision rules,
Bayes networks (Castillo, Mendoza, and Poblete 2011; Jin
et al. 2017b), recurrent neural network (Ma et al. 2016). Re-
searchers have explored both texts (Horne and Adal 2017)
and images (Jin et al. 2017a) as data sources.
Such research certainly plays an important role in reduc-
ing the amount of fake news. We suggest, however, that an-
other effective way to counter fake news is to help people
talk to each other (Sunstein 2009). This is because when
people holding different perceptions (Jervis 1976), ideas and
political views come together and openly discuss and debate
with each other, instead of cocooning in their own block,
fake news naturally disappears.
When information flows freely across communities, when
Democrats and Republicans talk to each other, when Israelis
and Palestinians talk to each other, and when North Kore-
ans and South Koreans talk to each other, mis-perceptions,
biases and fake news fade away.
Conclusion
In this paper we presented an in-depth study of political po-
larization and social division using social media data and
Monte Carlo simulations. First, we studied at the aggregate
level people’s inclination to retweet within their own ideo-
logical circles. We introduced the concept of cocoon ratio
and showed that Donald Trump’s followers are 2.56 more
likely to retweet a fellow Trump follower than to retweet
a Hillary Clinton follower. Second, going down to the in-
dividual level, we showed that the tendency of retweeting
exclusively within one’s own ideological circle is actually
stronger for women than for men and that such tendency
gradually weakens as one’s social capital grows. Third, we
used a one-dimensional Ising model to simulate how a soci-
ety with high cocoon ratios might end up becoming a com-
pletely closed society. We discussed our findings with re-
gards to fighting fake news and suggested that encourag-
ing open-minded discussion can serve as an effective way
to counter fake news.
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